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Bahr v. Regan, 6 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2021) 
Aspen B. Ward 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bahr v. Regan1 is the most recent challenge to the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) Exceptional Events Rule 
(“EER”) and highlights the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) shortcomings in 
addressing wildfire smoke pollution.  
Between June 17, 2015 to June 21, 2015 the Lake Fire consumed 
roughly 29,813 acres of California’s San Bernardino National Forest.2 
Three days later, in Phoenix, Arizona, three hundred miles east of the fire, 
six air quality monitors registered abnormally high concentrations of 
ozone that exceeded the standards under the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standard (“NAAQS”).3 Phoenix had long been out of attainment with 
ozone NAAQS and faced a July 2018 deadline to demonstrate attainment.4 
The EPA determined Phoenix had successfully attained the ozone 
NAAQS by the deadline, but only after using the EER to exclude the June 
2015 readings.5 This meant Arizona avoided additional and stricter 
regulatory burdens, including a need to develop contingency measures for 
failing to attain the NAAQS by the deadline.6  
A group of Phoenix citizens (“Petitioners”) sought review of the 
EPA’s final decision to exclude the June 2015 exceedances under the EER. 
The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review, determining the EPA’s 
findings and conclusion that Arizona “achieved the statutory required 
reduction in ozone concentration by July 2018” complied with the CAA.7 
This case illustrates the misalignment between public health, air quality, 
and wildfire smoke associated with the EPA’s EER. 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Wildfire smoke pollution has become a pervasive public health 
threat with few regulatory solutions.8 Scientists assert growing frequency 
and intensity of wildfires is largely attributable to symptoms of climate 
 
1. 6 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 2021). 
2. Bill Gabbert, Lake Fire, east of San Bernardino, California, 
WILDFIRE TODAY, June 18, 2015, https://perma.cc/7RYZ-RN26.  
3. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1063.  
4. Id.  
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 1059.  
8. Jennifer Hijazi, Wildfires Highlight What’s ‘Gone Wrong’ in 
Pollution Mitigation, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/ZH3G-
5DJN. 




change such as prolonged drought and periods of excessive heat.9 Fine 
particulate matter released by wildfires can be dangerous to human health 
when breathed at high concentrations.10  
The Lake Fire started on June 17, 2015 and burned a section of 
the San Bernardino National Forest roughly the size of San Francisco.11 
Smoke billowing off the Southern California fire caused hazy skies in 
Arizona but did not incite a health advisory from the Arizona Department 
of Environmental Quality (“ADEQ”).12 Prior to the Lake Fire, the EPA 
classified the nonattainment status of the Phoenix area as “moderate” and 
issued a revised attainment date of July 20, 2018.13  
On June 20, 2015, six Phoenix ozone monitors in that nonattainment 
region recorded 0.075ppm,14 exceeding the 2008 ozone NAAQS.15 The 
ADEQ notified the EPA in July 2016 they would seek to exclude these six 
exceedances under the EER. The EPA formally accepted ADEQ’s request 
and excluded those readings.16 The EER requires the EPA to exclude 
monitoring data if the exceedance was clearly caused by exceptional, 
uncontrollable events.17 The EPA revised the EER in October 2016, 
replacing the 2007 version.18 In 2020, Sandra Bahr and two co-plaintiffs 
challenged the EPA’s final rule excluding the exceedances, alleging the 
retroactive application of the 2016 EER to a 2015 wildfire event was 
improper.19  
 
III.  CLEAN AIR ACT 
The CAA’s general purpose is to promote public health and 
welfare through protections and enhancements to the United States’ air.20 
To effectuate this purpose, the CAA authorizes comprehensive federal and 
state regulations to limit emissions from stationary and mobile sources.21 
 
9. Peter Szekely & Steve Gorman, Western wildfire smoke causes 
cross-country air pollution, REUTERS (Jul. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/KBM2-CNNV. 
10. Nadja Popovich & Josh Katz, See How Wildfire Smoke Spread 
Across America, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/5JHA-6HR6. 
11. Haeyoun Park, Damien Cave, & Wilson Andrews, After Years of 
Drought, Wildfires Rage in California, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/68QA-TYDQ.  
12. Brian Rinker, California fire sends haze towards Grand Canyon, 
Arizona, AZ CENTRAL (Jun. 19, 2015), https://perma.cc/2FKH-Q4NN.  
13. Bahr, 6 F.4th 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2021). 
14. Id.  
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
17. Id. at 1059. 
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 1064; see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2018) (petitions for review 
for final action of the Administrator under the CAA which is “locally or regionally 
applicable” must be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
appropriate Circuit). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b) (2018). 
21. Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/5MGP-YKFZ (last visited Aug. 3, 2021).  
2021 Bahr v. Regan 3 
 
This is a goal-driven statute enacted for pollution prevention through 
federal, state, and local governmental administration.22  
Despite this structure, the CAA operates predominantly through 
state action, not direct federal control.23 NAAQS and State 
Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) are two of the most important regulatory 
devices the CAA uses to address air pollution. These fall under the 
directive of the EPA, directly and indirectly through their setting and 
revising regional NAAQS and reviewing SIPs.24 Further, the CAA 
provides liberal use for wildfire smoke as an exceptional event.25 
 An objection to a rule or procedure under the CAA must be “raised 
with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment may be 
raised during judicial review.”26 This is a threshold questions for the court 
to determine if a petitioner fulfilled the requirement to provide the agency 
sufficient notice so they may rectify the alleged violation that falls under 
the CAA.27 
 
A.  NAAQS and SIPs 
The NAAQS program requires the EPA to set limits on the 
atmospheric concentrations of six principal pollutants.28 The EPA set the 
ozone standard under NAAQS at 0.075ppm.29 Areas that do not meet the 
standards set under the NAAQS are identified by the EPA as 
“nonattainment areas.”30 A region attains NAAQS if each monitoring 
station in the nonattainment area has a “3-year calculated value at or below 
0.075ppm”.31 The manner in which the EPA has designed monitoring site 
compliance with NAAQS can lead to a single monitoring site to 
significantly impact the entire region’s attainment of NAAQS.32 The EPA 
addresses wildfire emissions primarily through these specific air pollutant 
standards.33 
 
22. Emily Williams, Comment, Reimagining Exceptional Events: 
Regulating Wildfires Through the Clean Air Act, 96 WASH. L. REV. 765, 77-778 
(2021).  
23. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1065. 
24. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4–50.12 (2020). 
25. Williams, supra note 26, at 768.  
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2018).   
27. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1070.  
28. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.1–50.19; see also NAAQS Table, U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/YCN4-YNRC (describes 
“criteria” air pollutants as primary and secondary standards with the average time and 
levels not to be exceeded).   
29. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1066.   
30. Id. at 1064. 
31. Id. at 1066.    
32. Id. at 1066 n.6.   
33. Bryan C. Williamson, Screaming “Wildfire” in a Crowded Clean 
Air Act, THE REGULATORY REVIEW (Aug. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/CYH6-N8P8.  




SIPs are state-developed technical reports that show how a state is 
in compliance or will reach compliance with NAAQS.34 Though states 
create SIPs, the EPA plays an important role by collaborating with a state’s 
environmental quality agency to develop a SIP Further, the EPA must 
review and approve or disapprove each element within the SIP and ensure 
the opportunity for public comment.35  
Through an agency memorandum later codified in regulation,36 
the EPA established a “Clean Data Policy” that functions as the agency’s 
interpretation of the SIP requirements.37 The Clean Data Policy  allows the 
EPA to suspend certain SIPs obligations for nonattainment areas while the 
area is actively attaining NAAQS ozone requirements, but before the area 
is redesignated formally.38 However, the SIPs requirements are only 
suspended “as long as the nonattainment area continues to monitor 
attainments of the standard.”39 
 
B.  EPA’s Exceptional Event Rule 
Under the EER, when the EPA makes an attainment 
determination, it must exclude any exceedances where the air quality was 
influenced by an “exceptional event”.40 For an event to qualify as 
exceptional it must be caused by human activity that is unlikely to recur 
as a particular natural event.41 It must also be considered not reasonably 
controllable or preventable.42 Further, to warrant exclusion as an 
exceptional event there must be a “clear causal relationship” between the 
NAAQS exceedance and the specified event.43 This requires a 
demonstration that the proposed event caused the specific air pollution 
concentration at the particular monitoring locations which experienced an 
exceedance.44 The EER specifically excludes stagnation of air masses, 
meteorological inversions or events involving high temperature or lack of 
precipitation, or air pollution due to source noncompliance.45  
Wildfires that cause ozone exceedances are often designated as 
exceptional events.46 This permits the air pollution created from these 
 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)–(j) (2018). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7427.   
36. Memorandum from John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality 
Planning Standards (May 10, 1995) at 1 [hereinafter Seitz Memo]; 40 C.F.R. § 51.118 
(2021). 
37. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1065–66.  
38. Id. at 1065–1066; see 40 C.F.R. § 51.118 (2021); 42 U.S.C. § 
7502(b), (c) (2018).  
39. Id. at 1066; see Seitz Memo at 4; 40 C.F.R. § 51.1118.  
40. Id. at 1066 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b) (2018)).  
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2018). 
42. Id. § 7619(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
43. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1066–67.   
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
45. Id. § 7619(b)(1)(B)(i)–(iii).  
46. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1067.  
2021 Bahr v. Regan 5 
 
events to be excluded from state efforts to meet air quality standards.47 The 
EPA replaced the 2007 EER with a revised 2016 version revising the state 
demonstration requirements.48 This new rule took away the “in excess of 
normal historical fluctuations” and “but for the event” standards and 
imported new demonstration standards.49  
The EPA finalized revisions to the EER in October 2016.50 The 
previous version, from 2007, required a state to prove, among other things, 
exceedances were outside historical fluctuations and caused by a “but for” 
event.51 The 2016 EER revisions took these standards out and imported 
new standards for a successful demonstration by the state.52  
To exclude data in air quality measurements, the state must 
request that the EPA flag measurements it may want to exclude at a later 
date.53 The state must prove wildfire emissions were: “(1) transported to 
monitor; (2) affected the monitor; and (3) caused the ozone 
exceedances”.54 
 
i.  Presumption Against Retroactivity 
 
The presumption against retroactivity generally prevents 
interpreting statutes and regulations to apply to events occurring prior to 
their effective date.55 The Supreme Court established a two-step approach 
to evaluate when the presumption against retroactivity does not apply in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products.56 Under Landgraf, it must be determined 
whether “‘Congress has expressly prescribed’ that a regulation is to be 
retroactively applied”57 and “whether application of the regulation would 
have retroactive effect.”58 Presumption against retroactivity exists where 
the retroactive application of statues and rules impairs “prior-existing 
rights and . . . affect[s] reliance interests.”59  
 
 
47. Hijazi, supra note 8.  
48. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1067.   
49. Id.   
50. Id.  
51. Id. at 1067. 
52. Id.  
53. Kirsten H. Engel, Perverse Incentives: The Case of Wildfire Smoke 
Regulation, 40 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 623, 649 (2013). 
54. Bahr, at 1067–68 (This standard of proof is known as a Tier 3 
demonstration under EPA guidance documents and is used for complex causation 
relationships between wildfire and ozone. More straightforward instances require less 
documentation and proof under Tier 1 or Tier 2.). 
55. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1069.  
56. 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).   
57. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1072 (citing Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 
935, 939 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)). 
58. Id. (citing Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
59. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 270 
(1994)).  




IV.  DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit ruled the EPA complied with the CAA.60 Under the 
APA, courts set aside agency action if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”61 The court 
found Petitioners failed to bring their objections in a timely manner and 
did not exhaust administrative remedies.62 Further, the court held the 
EPA’s exclusion of the June 2015 exceedances under the 2016 EER was 
permissible under the CAA framework. Accordingly, the court denied the 
petition for review.63  
 
A.  Retroactive Application of the 2016 Version of the EER was Proper 
 
The court determined the EPA did not violate the presumption 
against retroactivity by applying the 2016 EER to a 2015 wildfire.64 The 
court reasoned the rule did not have a prohibitive retroactive effect because 
the use of the 2016 version in lieu of the 2007 version did not impair 
“vested rights, create new obligations, or otherwise impact any interests in 
fair notice, reasonable reliance, or settled expectations.”65 The court 
considered whether Petitioners exhausted administrative remedies on the 
issue before evaluating the argument’s merits.66 
 
1.  Petitioners Did Not Exhaust Administrative Remedies 
 
The court reviewed the administrative remedies provided by the  
CAA and determined Petitioners  had not exhausted those remedies.67 The 
court noted the CAA allows objections to rules or procedures to be 
justiciable if raised “with reasonable specificity during the period for 
public comment.”68 Though the court acknowledged a procedural 
exhaustion requirement should be broad in its interpretation, it may only 
considers issues sufficiently and clearly expressed to the decision-making 
agency to understand and rule on the issue raised.69 In short, an objection 
to an agency’s action must be sufficiently clear to put the agency on notice. 
Petitioners acknowledged the likely absence of sufficient clarity as their 
comment implicitly contested the EPA’s decision but failed to explicitly 
 
60. Sebastian Malo, 9th Circ. denies challenge to EPA approval of Arizona 
ozone levels, REUTERS July 28, 2021, https://perma.cc/Z7GX-BN9V. 
61. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1069 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
62. Id. at 1085. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 1074. 
65. Id.  
66. Id. at 1071.  
67. Id. at 1070. 
68. Id. at 1069–70 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) regarding 
petition for judicial review of administerial action promulgating any national primary 
or secondary ambient air quality standard).  
69. Id. at 1070.  
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do so. Petitioners’ comment addressed one requirement unique to the 2007 
rule: a failure to show exceedances were “in excess of historical 
fluctuations” by the ADEQ.70 Further, they claimed their comment 
critiqued the analysis ADEQ used to demonstrate the “but for” 
requirement.71 However, because Petitioners themselves did not discuss 
this explicitly, the court found the EPA would be challenged to interpret 
this criticism as a suggestion the governing rule should be the 2007 version 
rather than the 2016.72 The court found Petitioners’ comments, on their 
face, to be an observance of exceedance and not a clearly stated argument 
regarding failures of the 2007 “in excess of historical fluctuations” 
exceedance requirement.73 The court held Petitioners failed to exhaust 
their administrative remedies regarding application of the 2007 or 2016 
EER.74  
 
2.  Applying the 2016 Exceptional Events Rule Does Not Violate a 
Presumption Against Retroactivity 
 
Even if Petitioners had satisfied the necessary administrative 
procedures, the court nonetheless found the application of the 2016 EER 
did not have an impermissibly retroactive effect.75 There is no dispute that 
six air quality monitors in Phoenix recorded exceedances of the ozone 
pollution standard of 0.075 parts per million on June 20, 2015.76 Here, 
Petitioners asserted the 2007 EER should have applied to the Lake Fire 
exceedances. This claim rested on the presumption against retroactivity, 
which generally prevents applying statutes and regulation to events having 
occurred prior to their effective date.77 However, this presumption exists 
only where application of those statues and rules has a retroactive effect 
“impairing prior-existing rights and . . . affecting reliance interests.”78 
Therefore, the EPA’s application of the 2016 EER in lieu of the 2007 rule 
is valid only if it there is no impact on Petitioners’ vested rights and did 
not effect a regulated party’s interest for notice, reasonable reliance, or a 
settled expectations.79  
The court used the approach set forth in Landgraf to determine the 
presumption against retroactivity did not apply.80 For the first step, neither 
party contended the EPA possesses expressed retroactive authority as 
 
70. Id.  
71. Id. at 1070 n.11.  
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 1070.  
74. Id. at 1071.  
75. Id.  
76. Pet’rs’ Opening Brief 31, Bahr v. Regan, 6 F.4th 1059 (9th Cir. 
2020) (No. 20-70092). 
77. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1069.  
78. Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 270, 
(1994)).  
79. Id. at 1071.  
80. Id. at 1072.  




applied to exceptional events.81 For the second step in the Landgraf 
analysis, the court looked to the timing of the exceedances to determine if 
any vested rights under the CAA were impaired by the EPA’s application 
of the 2016 EER rather than the 2007 version.82 The court held Petitioners’ 
interest was not in the “application of any particular rule on any particular 
date,” but rather in the “accurate and faithful enforcement” according to 
best scientific judgement.83 Petitioners offered no evidence contradicting 
the revised rule as a “valid and faithful endeavor by the EPA to implement 
the Clean Air Act,” and rather than impairing Petitioners’ interests, those 
interests were better served under the revised rule.84  
With no complaint from the ADEQ and no demonstration from 
Petitioners that the EPA’s application of the 2016 EER retroactively 
impaired any vested rights or other concerns, the court held the retroactive 
application the EPA was permissible.85  
 
B.  A Clear Causal Relationship Existed Between California’s Lake Fire 
and the June 20 Exceedances in Phoenix 
 
The court upheld the EPA’s finding that a clear causal relationship 
existed between the 2015 Lake Fire and the measured exceedances in 
Phoenix.86 The EPA’s findings on this relationship were reviewed under 
the APA’s “arbitrary or capricious” standard.87 Because the review 
consisted primarily of factual issues, the court deferred to the agency’s 
technical expertise. 88 The EPA reviewed ADEQ’s petition to exclude data 
and determined whether ADEQ adequately demonstrated a clear causal 
relationship that the Lake Fire smoke emissions were “(1) transported to 
the six monitors; (2) affected the monitors; and (3) caused the ozone 
exceedances.”89 The court determined a rational connection existed 
between the evidence relied upon by the EPA and their conclusions 
regarding these three requirements.90 Petitioners provided no supporting 
technical models for their comment to the EPA, rather they argued the 
evidence relied upon by the EPA failed to support a clear causal 
relationship.91 The court found little merit in several of Petitioners’ 
arguments.92  
 
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 1073.  
83. Id.  
84. Id. at 1074.  
85. Id. 
86. Id.  
87. Id. at 1075.  
88. Id.  
89. Id. (A petition to exclude is a request from state air pollution 
officials for the EPA to review a demonstration seeking to exclude data from 
monitoring sites where there was an exceedance preventing compliance with NAAQS 
standards.).  
90. Id.  
91. Id.   
92. Id. at 1076 n.17.  
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First, Petitioners argued against evidence that the smoke 
emissions were transported to the six monitors. They primarily disagreed 
with the following submissions of the ADEQ: (1) satellite images and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration smoke maps 
illustrating smoke plumage trajectories of the Lake Fire; and (2) 
geographic pattern of heightened ozone concentrations for Arizona on 
June 19 and 20.93 The court relied on the EPA’s expertise, particularly as 
Petitioners failed to show the absence of a rational connection between 
ADEQ’s factual demonstrations and the EPA’s conclusion that smoke 
from the Lake Fire affected the six ozone monitors.94 
To determine whether the Lake Fire affected the six monitors, the 
court deferred to the EPA conclusions that organic carbon and elemental 
carbon are relevant to the causation analysis as those compounds are 
largely associated with biomass smoke emitted during wildfires.95 The 
court concluded the EPA’s Wildfire Ozone Guidance permits using data 
from “co-located or nearby” monitors, meaning the EPA’s use of Phoenix 
Supersite Data was justified.96 This rationally connected the Lake Fire to 
the six exceedances. The court failed to find fault with the EPA’s technical 
conclusions with no contrary evidence or demonstration of analytical 
error.97  
Finally, the court looked at the demonstration that the Lake Fire 
emissions caused the ozone exceedances.98 The ADEQ submitted three 
matching day analyses comparing the June 20, 2015, exceedances to 
previous readings based on: “(1) days with similar meteorological 
conditions, (2) days which also recorded exceedances, and (3) days of the 
week.”99 The EPA determined this evidence, along with other submitted 
analyses, sufficiently demonstrated “a clear casual connection between 
Lake Fire emissions and the exceedances.”100 Because the court found 
Petitioners’ arguments undermined their own positions and failed to 
contradict the EPA’s findings, it rule the EPA had not acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously.101  
 
C. The EPA Properly Interpreted Suspending SIP Attainment 
Contingency Measures 
 
In an issue of first impression, the court looked at whether the 
CAA requires SIPs to contain attainment contingency measures where the 
EPA determines a nonattainment area has attained the NAAQS by the 
 
93. Id. at 1076–77.  
94. Id. at 1077. 
95. Id. at 1077–78.  
96. Id.  
97. Id. at 1077.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. at 1079. 
100. Id.    
101. Id.  




attainment date.102 The court granted the agency Chevron deference after 
concluding  the CAA is silent regarding whether SIPs must contain such 
measures.103 Where a statute is silent or ambiguous on an issue, Chevron 
directs courts to defer to an agency interpretation so long as that 
interpretation is reasonable.104 The court looked first at whether 
administrative remedies were exhausted and then whether Chevron 
deference supported the EPA’s construction of the CAA contingency 
measures requirement  
The EPA argued Petitioners forfeited their argument as their 
comment did not assert that the EPA’s proposal to suspend the attainment 
contingency measures requirement was unlawful under the CAA.105 
Though Petitioners did comment, they did not address the agency’s 
interpretation of the nonattainment plan provisions under 42 U.S.C § 
7502(c)(9).106 The court noted that Petitioners, in their comment failed to 
understand the EPA was not applying its Clean Data Policy, but rather 
interpreting attainment contingency measures under the CAA.107 
Therefore, the court held Petitioners failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies because they failed to raise their issue with sufficient clarity to 
the EPA.108 
The court then considered, had administrative remedies been 
exhausted, whether the CAA prevented the EPA from suspending the 
attainment contingency measure requirements. The court found the EPA 
was not prevented from suspending the requirements under the 
circumstances.109 With the CAA silent on this matter, the court applied 
Chevron deference and determined the EPA reasonably interpreted 42 
U.S.C. § 75029(c)(9).110  The court determined the EPA’s decision to 
suspend only attainment contingency measures was a narrow 
interpretation and did not violate NAAQS.111 Further, the court found the 
EPA’s interpretation was not a means for a state to avoid their 
responsibilities under the CAA to  meet NAAQS attainments.112 
 
102. Id. at 1082.  
103. Id. at 1085 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) which created the two-part legal test granting deference to 
government agency’s when interpreting statutes for which that agency is tasked with 
administering).  
104. Williams, supra note 26, at 792.  
105. Bahr, 6 F.4th at 1080.  
106. Id. at 1081 (42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(9) (2021) relates to contingency 
measures requiring plans to “provide the implementation of specific measures to be 
undertaken if the area fails to make reasonable further progress, or to attain the 
national primary ambient air quality standard by the attainment date . . . .such plans 
shall be included in the plan revision as contingency measures to take effect in any 
such case without further action by the State or the Administrator”).  
107. Id. at 1081.  
108. Id. at 1082.  
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 1085.  
111. Id.   
112. Id.   
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Therefore, the EPA could suspend attainment contingency measure 
requirements despite Phoenix’s previous failures to reach the necessary air 
quality standards by the attainment date.  
 
V.  CASE ANALYSIS 
The legal framing the court used is well-founded and within 
precedent, however the framework itself neglects to consider the shift of 
wildfire regimes and mechanisms to mitigate air quality concerns. The 
EER’s inclusion of wildfires as an exceptional event fails to support the 
purposes of the CAA. Exposure to smoke is one of the most pressing 
public health concerns.113 Wildfire smoke inhalation is the cause of 
numerous health problems and has been linked to early death, low infant 
birth weight, and a series of severe respiratory problems for vulnerable 
populations.114 With fire events increasing in severity and frequency, the 
risks of smoke exposure are similarly increasing. This is largely due to the 
history of the United States Forest Service’s (“USFS”) forest and wildfire 
management across the West.  
The USFS wildfire suppression strategy became the principal 
management directive of the USFS after the 1910 fires swept across Idaho, 
Montana, and Washington, devastating more than three million acres of 
private and federal lands, and killing at least 85 people.115 The dominant 
narrative post-1910 to suppress fires and the public threat of fire 
influenced the legislative and executive for several generations of land 
managers. More than 100 years of this fire suppression strategy led to 
extensive fuel build-up and increased the likelihood of high-severity and 
high-frequency fires. When wildfires are suppressed, opportunities to 
create fuel breaks, reduce departure from natural fire regimes, and 
decrease future extreme fire behavior are lost.116 Though fire seasons are 
expected to worsen, there is no mechanism for accountability in air quality 
consequences with wide-reaching threats to public health.117 
 
A.  The Exceptional Events Rule Fails to Support the Intent of the CAA 
 
The EER does not support the purpose of the CAA. There are three 
major areas of concern with the EPA’s engagement of air quality issues 
relating to wildfire management and smoke emissions. These issues are: 
(1) allowing states to petition to exclude NAAQS exceedances from 
wildfire smoke emissions, (2) the inclusion of wildfire as an exceptional 
event, and (3) EER classifying wildfires as “natural” rather than 
 
113. Williams, supra note 26, at 776. 
114. Id.  
115. The 1910 Fires, FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY, 
https://perma.cc/AX2M-Z6RD (last visited Aug. 23, 2021). 
116. Brett H. Davis, Carol Miller, & Sean A. Parks, Retrospective Fire 
Modeling: Quantifying the Impacts of Fire Suppression, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
AGRICULTURE (Apr. 2010), at 1, https://perma.cc/PJ8Q-VD87.  
117. Hijazi, supra note 8.  




“anthropogenic” given the extensive history of fire suppressions role in 
the current fire regime. At their root, each of these three issues can be 
traced back to how the EPA and CAA think about fire and the language 
used. 
The EPA should cease granting state requests to exclude air 
pollution readings attributable to wildfire. These requests are made when 
determining the state’s compliance with NAAQS. By allowing states to 
petition for excluding NAAQS exceedances, smoke management is 
dictated by reactive wildfire management efforts that are unable to address 
air pollution issues. Changes to air quality laws to incentivize proactive 
management efforts should require NAAQS to include emissions from 
large wildfires or limit the discretion of local air regulators to block 
prescribed fire projects that look to mitigate wildfire risks and smoke 
emissions.118  
The EPA should exclude uncontrolled wildfires from the EER.119 
Currently, the EPA interprets the EER to exempt wildfire events from 
CAA compliance with air quality management. To incentivize prescribed 
fires, wildfires need to be included in NAAQS compliance to encourage 
local air management districts to use managed fires to reduce risks of 
severe fires.120 In removing wildfire emission from the EER, smoke 
management could implement proactive treatment strategies, such as 
prescribed fire. Though failures in air standard compliance may still 
threaten public health, proactive, rather than reactive management, would 
reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfires. at the severity seen today.121  
Another place for revision is abandoning the distinction between 
“natural” and “anthropogenic” when considering wildfires and prescribed 
fire events in regulation.122 Given the consequences of fire suppression 
policy, unplanned wildfires as a “natural” phenomenon is a disingenuous 
descriptor.123 Even outside the EPA’s EER, referring to unplanned 
wildfires as “natural” post-suppression gives a public impression wildfire 
smoke is less harmful to health and visibility than smoke from prescribed 
fires.124 Importantly, the EPA’s treatment of wildfires as per se natural 
events is inconsistent with the agency’s own definition which classifies a 
wildfire as an unplanned ignition and includes the language “unauthorized 
and accidental human caused fires”.125 
The air quality threats resulting from wildfires should no longer 
be deemed exceptional as it becomes the new normal.126 Satellite-based 
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estimates show a steady increase of “smokey days” across the United 
States with smoke quickly becoming a regional air pollution issue.127 To 
better address worsening air pollution issues from wildfire smoke 
emissions, the EER will need to stop considering wildfires an exceptional 
event. In Bahr, the court relied on the correct legal framework, however 
an opportunity was missed in critiquing how these exceptions to air 
pollution standards affect public health. The Ninth Circuit is comprised 
largely of western states adversely and persistently affected by the smoke 
emissions of worsening wildfire seasons. Neglecting to address how 
excluding wildfire smoke emissions from NAAQS standards via the EER 
shows a failure in understanding the heart of the CAA’s intent. 
 
B.  Cross-boundary Smoke Can Cause NAAQS Exceedances 
 
Wildfires are a recurring, episodic source of air pollution with 
intensifying threats to public health in the face of climate change.128 
Smoke does not adhere to state boundaries, rather it travels at the behest 
of weather patterns. Jet streams and cross-continental air currents can carry 
smoke and ash thousands of miles, affecting people nowhere near the fire 
itself with air contaminants.129 It is not uncommon for wildfires in different 
states, or even from Canada, to adversely affect ambient air quality across 
the continent. In 2021, wildfire smoke from Canada and Western United 
States triggered unhealthy air quality levels across must of the East 
Coast.130  
The Bahr court recognized the agency’s technical expertise 
supported the clear causal relationship between the Lake Fire in California 
and the six exceedances 300 miles away in Phoenix, Arizona. Though this 
is a meaningful requirement to exempt an event under the EER, it is 
increasingly less relevant to addressing the real issues around wildfire and 
air quality exceedance. 
Dedicating resources and time to proving the relationship between 
a particular fire and specific exceedances does little to address the issue of 
air pollution from wildfire smoke emissions. Agencies have continuously 
sought to better develop technical tools and mapping techniques to better 
understand fire behavior and smoke emissions. This expertise is accessible 
and well-understood across the scientific discipline. Rather than requiring 
an agency to prove an exceedance has a clear causal relationship to a 
wildfire, resources should be spent in proactive management that seeks to 
avoid those exceedances in the first place. This will require administrative 
guidance from the EPA and United States Forest Service that promotes 
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proactive treatments and management strategies across western forests. 
These strategies may include treatments such as thinning or prescribed fire 
to reduce hazardous fuels that will combust in aa wildfire event and emit 
smoke, particularly around densely populated parts of the western U.S. By 
treating fuel loads before a fire ignites, hazardous levels of smoke 
emissions will be mitigated, and NAAQS exceedances will decrease in 
frequency.  
 
C.  Chevron Deference is in Trouble 
The court’s analysis of the question regarding the EPA’s 
suspension of SIP attainment contingency measures was done primarily 
through the standard set forth in Chevron. Though agencies often have 
specialized expertise that is worth considering, Chevron deference is 
becoming increasingly controversial.  
In recent years, some justices on the current United States 
Supreme Court have been critical of this established law. Justice Thomas 
criticized Chevron in his concurrence in Michigan v. EPA,131 while 
Justices Kavanaugh and Gorsuch have publicly criticized this doctrine 
prior to their appointment to the Supreme Court.132 Despite this criticism, 
the Supreme Court has so far declined to reexamine Chevron.133 With 
Justice Barrett’s confirmation, there is some anticipation the Robert Court 
may weaken, if not overturn, this agency deference.134 Circuit and district 
courts continue to apply Chevron and would still likely apply to the CAA 
even if it is limited in other ways as it is strongest when it is applied to a 
direct agency delegation of “complicated and expert driven regulations.135 
Looking forward, it is important to note Arizona statutorily 
overturned Chevron deference with respect to most of the state’s agencies 
with House Bill 2238 in 2018.136 Where state agencies interpretation or 
expertise is in question in future cases, deference will no longer be given. 
This requires the court, in reviewing a final administrative decision 
“brought by or against a regulated party” to decide all legal questions 
without deference and without “any previous determination by the 
agency.”137 Though petitions for review like in Bahr go straight to a Court 
of Appeals in the appropriate circuit, the court may still consider the state’s 
choice to remove Chevron deference when considering a state agency’s 
actions.  
It is reasonable to expect Chevron deference may be weakened or 
entirely unavailable for a court to rely on when considering an agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute. This will provide a different scope 
of review for the courts to determine if an agency’s action was proper. 
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Given the turmoil of the Trump Administration in appointing agency 
administrators, the loss of Chevron may not be as bleak as it appears. The 
EPA had two administrators over the course of four years, both of whom 
broadly supported the fossil fuels industry, made careers attacking the 
agency they would head, and public questions climate science.138 
Decisions made under those administrators would still be subject to this 
standard of review for actions that may disregard the CAA implicitly. The 
swings in policy between administrations appointing the heads of agency 
should be of concern when those agencies are given broad deference for 
actions taken. However, Chevron allows agencies to focus on the scope of 
their work with the knowledge that judicial review of agency action will 
fall under this deference and that can be a benefit for agencies.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Across the western United States, increased wildfire risk resulting 
from historic fire suppression strategies and climate change calls for fire 
management reform.139 The current legal framework to address issues of 
wildfire smoke emissions on air quality is well-formed yet in need of 
revision to better align the regulations with the purpose of the CAA. First 
and foremost, the EER is reactive and limits proactive approaches to 
wildfire and smoke management by disincentivizing prescribed fire while 
misrepresenting the continuous negative impact of wildfires on ambient 
air quality standards. By removing modern wildfires as an “exceptional 
event,” more proactive approaches to mitigate conditions contributing to 
offending smoke emissions are more realistic. Further, suspending SIPs 
attainment measures is contrary to the CAA because it fails to support the 
Act’s stated purpose of promoting public health and welfare through 
protections and enhancements to the United States’ air resource.  
This case was decided on the brink of administrative, scientific, 
and management shifts, all of which are considering how symptoms of 
climate change are impacting the frequency and severity of wildfires and 
how that is growing to be a constant public health threat from smoke 
emissions. Moving forward, more issues about the EPA’s Exceptional 
Events Rule and NAAQS will need to be addressed by the courts. 
However, it will unlikely be through the lens of retroactive presumption 
and SIPs contingency measures. It is important to think about how these 
regulations are not supportive of the CAA as they stand with wildfire 
smoke emissions. Particularly, if Chevron deference is weakened or 
becomes a more stringent test, the EPA may struggle to continue applying 
these regulations on smoke emissions related to wildfires.    
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